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NOTE AND COMMENT.
PROVABILITY iN BANKRUPTCY OF CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF ALIMONY DECREES
OR SEPARATION AGREIrMENTS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WivrE.-I.t was not until

the decisions in Audubon v. Shufeldt, 18I U. S. 575, and Wetmore v. Markoe;
196 U. S. 68, that it was authoritatively determined in this country that alimony, whether in arrears at the time of filing petition, or payable in the
future, was not provable in bankruptcy. In the first case it was pointed out
that an alimony allowance is generally alterable in the discretion of the court
entering the original order; but the real basis of the decision appears to havebeen that "permanent alimony is to be regarded rather as a portior of the.
husband's estate to which the wife is equitably entitled, than as strictly a
debt." In the second case it appeared that by the law of New York in which
-State the alimony judgment involved had been entered, the allowance was unalterable, and it was urged that the Audubon case, therefore, should not be
considered controlling. The court held squarely that alimony, even though
evidenced by an unalterable judgment, was not a debt within the Bankruptcy
Act. The English courts have taken the same position as to the provability
of a-limony clainms. Linton v. Linton (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 239; Hawkins v.
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Hawkins [1894], 1 Q. B. 2s; Watkins v. Watkins [1896], Prob. 222; Kerr v.
Kerr 11897], 2 Q. B. 439.
In Dunbarv. Dunbar, 79o U. S. 34o, the court had under consideration the
liability of the defendant to the plaintiff, his divorced wife, upon a contract
entered into between them after a divorce, but pursuant to a pre-divorce
agreement, by which contract the defendant obligated himself to pay the
plaintiff a certain sum annually during her life or widowhood and also a certain sum for the support of their two children. The defendant had pleaded
and proved in defense, his discharge in bankruptcy. It appeared that plaintiff
had filed a claim for the amount due her at the time the petition was filed,
but whether she had received a dividend is not clear. The court decided that
not
the contract as to the plaintiff's personal claim was not pTovable, hence
discharged, because the contingency of her remarrying could not be accurately
measured. However Mr. Justice PFCKHAMf, who wrote the opinion, after
referring to the rule as to alimony claims as laid down in Audubon v. Shufeldt, supra, said: "We are not by any means clear that the same principle
ought not to govern a contract of this nature when, although the judgment of
divorce is silent upon the subject, it is plain that the contract was made with
reference to the obligations of the husband to aid in the support of the wife,
the
notwithstanding the decree." As to the sums contracted to be paid. for
create
not
did
contract
the
that
held
court
maintenance of the children the
or evidence a debt, but was merely a recognition of the father's common-law
liability to support his minor children, and so that part of the claim was also
held not to have been discharged.
In Victor v. Victor [1912], 1 K. B. 247, the Court of Appeal held that by
the husband's discharge in bankruptcy, he was relieved of all liability, past,
present, and future, for the payment of an' annuity to his wife, the annuity
the
having been provided for in a separation agreement entered into by
this
in
annuity
The
bankruptcy.
husband's
the
parties sometime prior to
case was to cease in case-the parties resumed cohabitation. The court held,
following the extremely liberal English doctrine as to the allowance of conthe
tingent claims, discussed in Hardy v. Fothergill, 13 App. Cas. 351, that
inclaim
the
render
not
did
cohabitation
resuming
contingency of the parties
capable of estimation and proof. In the Victor case the judges distinguish
Linton v. Linton. supra, which held an alimony order unaffected by the former
is subhusband's bankruptcy discharge, on the ground that aji alimony order
that
held
has
which
court
a
that
odd
rather
is
It
time.
ject to change at any
a dithe contingency of- parties resuming- cohabitation, the contingency of
remainvorced womarr remarrying, the contingency of a divorced woman not
ing chaste, (Ex parte Neal, L. R. 14 Ch. D. 579) are capable of measurement
should balk when it comes to estimating the chances that a court will change
an alimony order.
In 1903 § 17 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act was amended so as to except
from the operation of a discharge in bankruptcy liabilities "for alimony due
or to become due, or for maintenance or support of wife or child." This
and
amendment became effective after the decision in -the Audubon case
become
had
cases
Ie'tmnorc
and
Dunbar
the
in
parties
after the rights of the
a
fixed. So in this country, at the present time, there could be no basis for
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contention that a discharge in bankruptcy operated to relieve the bankrupt
from an obligation of the sort considered in Victor v. Victor, supra. However it does not seem necessarily settled that such a contract with the element
of contingency eliminated may not be made the basis of a provable claim.
The Supreme Court, as above noted, in the Dunbar case suggested that perhaps such a contract should le considered as on the same basis as an alimony
order, but the decision as to the non-provability of the wife's claim was based
on its contingency. A case might very easily arise where it would be very unfortunate for the wife, or former wife, if she were not permitted to prove
her claim, especially as to the sums in arrears. In the alimony cases the court
held that such claims were not provable even as to arrearages, but in the
Dunbar case, in which it was a contract that was the basis of the claim, that
R. W. A.
question was not passed upon.
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